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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a summary judgment ruling on June 23, 2004, in
which the trial court granted Christopherson, Farris, White & Utley, P.C.'s
(hereinafter "the firm") motion for summary judgment against defendant/appellant
Deanna Pugh (hereinafter "Deanna"). This appeal was timely filed, and later was
transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann.
78-2A-3(2)G).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Deanna brings the following issues for review:
First Issue
The trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment of the
firm's breach of contract cause of action. The trial court applied the wrong
standard of law. It failed to apply the correct elements for a breach of contract
cause of action related to an attorney-client contract and it permitted the firm to
succeed in its case without proving or pleading it performed its contractual duties
or that it billed Deanna fair, reasonable and accurate charges. These were issues
of material fact that should have prevented the firm's motion for summary
judgment.
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Standard of Review
The first issue can be decided as a matter of law under Bennett v. Jones,
70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003).
Second Issue
The trial court erred in dismissing Deanna's fraud cause of action
when Deanna properly pled all of the required elements.
Standard of Review
The second issue can be decided as a matter of law. Crookston v. Fire
Insurance. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); Sernenov v. Hill 982 P.2d 578 (Utah).
Third Issue
The trial court erred in dismissing Deanna's breach of contract cause of
action because Deanna properly pled that she performed under the agreement. The
firm admitted to submitting an incorrect bill for payment only after it initiated its
lawsuit. Deanna was right not to pay the fraudulent bill, and the firm admitted that
Deanna was not obligated to pay that bill. Therefore, Deanna properly pled she
performed under the contract and the firm breached its contractual obligations.
Standard of Review
The third issue can be decided as a matter of law under Bennett v. Jones,
70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003).
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Fourth Isssue
The trial court erred in dismissing Deanna's cause of action for the firm's
breach of its fiduciary duties. Deanna was damaged by the firm's breach and
properly pled damages in her Answer and Counterclaim.
Standard of Review
The fourth issue can be decided as a matter of law. Bennett v. Jones. 70
P.3d 17 (Utah 2003).
Fifth Issue
The trial court erred in dismissing Deanna's cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because Deanna properly pled damages and factual
allegations that should be considered conduct that is "outrageous" and
"intolerable."
Standard of Review
The fifth can be decided as a matter of law. Franco v. The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints. 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001); Bennett v. Jones. 70 P.3d 17
(Utah 2003).
Sixth Issue
The trial court erred in awarding the firm its attorney's fees incurred in
prosecuting its breach of contract action and in defending Deanna's breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional
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distress claims. The agreement's language did not allow for such award, and the
trial court abused its discretion by not requiring the firm's counsel to comply with
Utah R.Civ.P. 73(b). Due to the ambiguous nature of the award, the firm charged
attorney's fees and costs that were unverified and patently umeasonable knowing
that it now had a carte blanche judgment against Deanna.
Standard of Review
The sixth can be decided as a matter of law. Turtle Management, Inc.
v. Haggis Management Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. vs. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Utah App. 1989); Loosle v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n.. 858 P.2d 999, 1003 (Utah 1993); Maynardv.
Wharton. 916 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996).
STANDARD OF REVIEW AS TO ALL ISSUES
On appeal from a summary judgment, evidence is reviewed in a light
most favorable to the losing party. An award of summary judgment is
appropriate only if the pleadings, affidavits, and other submissions of the parties
show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. (56(c); Utah
State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light. 776 P.2d 632,
634 (Utah 1989); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co.. 714 P.2d 648, 649
(Utah 1986). Deanna further admits that a mere conflict in fact is not enough to
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challenge a summary judgment on appeal: the fact must be material.
This Court, on appeal from summary judgment, reviews the trial court's
legal conclusions with no deference for correctness, and indeed all inferences
which may be drawn from the facts should be made in the non-moving party's
favor. Pride Stables v. Homestead Golf Club, Inc., 82 P.3d 198, 201 (Utah Ct.
App. 2003).
PRESERVATION OF ALL ISSUES
All of the issues were preserved in multiple motions and memoranda before
the trial court, especially the motions and memoranda supporting and disputing
the firm's motions for summary judgment. See Record Index pp. 1, 7, 56, 65, 346,
348, 407, 412, 424, 656, 661, 767, 776, 873, 889.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Deanna brings the following statement of the case for the Court's review:
Nature of the Case
The firm initiated a breach of contract to force Deanna into paying a
fraudulently mailed May 7, 2003 invoice and/or be liable for "unbilled" fees as
shown in its July 15, 2003 "Sample Invoice." Deanna answered the Complaint
with an Answer and Counterclaim for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The firm's fees charged to Deanna are heavily disputed for several different
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reasons, including billing by people other than the designated attorney to perform
the exact same tasks, double billing for the presence of a senior attorney with the
designated attorney, who had barely passed the bar and lacked the experience to
attend such hearings by himself, unbeknownst to Deanna, without Deanna's
notification and prior authorization, billing for the same costs on two separate bills,
billing for three attorneys to discuss the bill after the firm withdrew as counsel, and
billing paralegal fees at $65.00 per hour for clerical tasks even though the firm did
not employ paralegals, the firm only employed Legal Assistants at the rate of
$60.00 per hour.
These contentions are material as to whether these fees were fair and
reasonable and pursuant to the terms of the contract. Because they were not fair or
reasonable, there are material issues of fact to which summary judgment was
granted inappropriately in this matter. Deanna also disputes that the firm
performed its duties as required under an attorney-client relationship.
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
The Firm asserted the following grounds to support its motion for summary
judgment:
1.

Summary judgment on the firm's breach of contract cause of action

should be granted because: (i) a legal right has been invaded by Deanna; (ii)
Deanna's actions are the cause in fact of the firm's damages; and (iii) the firm has
clearly been damaged by Deanna's actions.
6

2.

Summary judgment on Deanna's fraud claim should be granted

because (i) Deanna has not sufficiently pled that the firm made a material
representation; and (ii) Deanna has not sufficiently pled that the firm had not made
a material misrepresentation regarding a. presently material fact.
3.

Summary judgment on Deanna's breach of contract claim should be

granted because (i) Deanna has not pled that she performed under the terms of the
parties' contract; and (ii) Deanna has failed to assert the breach of an express
promise by the firm.
4.

Summary judgment on Deanna's breach of fiduciary duty claim

should be granted because (i) no causal link to damages exists in the present case
and (ii) Mr. Bernard's actions constitute superceding and intervening acts, which
cut off the firm's liability, if any exists.
5.

Summary judgment on Deanna's intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim should be granted because Deanna has not pled facts that can
constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The trial court granted the firm's motion for summary judgment on all causes
of action made in its complaint only, and by doing so, abused its discretion
and disregarded the law:
The trial court granted the firm's Motion for Summary Judgment on June 23,
2004. (See Addendum at A7? Summary Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, Record Index p. 656.)
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On approximately November 1, 2002, Deanna discovered that efforts were
underway to exhume the body of her son by her son's third wife of 11 months.
Deanna sought legal representation, and met with Eric Gentry ("Gentry"), an
associate attorney with Christopherson, Farris, White & Utley, P.C., of St. George,
Utah. During the initial interview, Deanna signed a fee agreement after Gentry
explained to her the terms of their relationship. (See Record Index p. 424,
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A, paragraphs 22-27; see also Record Index
p. 661.) Under this agreement, Deanna believed that Gentry was to be her attorney
at an hourly rate of $125.00. A third notation of this understanding was included
in the notes portion of the fee agreement. (See Addendum at Al, the Fee
Agreement.)
Gentry prepared documents initiating a Petition for Permanent
Injunction. On December 16 and December 17, 2002, a hearing was held to
determine whether or not the temporary restraining order would become a
permanent injunction. The trial court continued the hearing for his determination
of the outcome until after the holidays. At some point soon after, the trial court
scheduled the continued hearing for March 2003. Without authorization from

8

Deanna and just immediately before the scheduled hearing of March 20, 2003,
Gentry continued that hearing date until April 15, 2003.
In the midst of the battle to protect her son's grave and prior to Deanna
becoming aware of the firm's fraudulent billing practices and Gentry's failure to
perform his duties under the contract, Deanna paid Gentry $4,000, which was
$4,000 beyond the $500 estimated by Gentry to handle the exhumation injunction.
Due to Gentry's repeated failure to communicate with Deanna about the status and
preparation of her case, Deanna sought the advise of another attorney. On or about
April 11, 2003, in the hopes that the payment of $4,500 to Gentry provided some
research and reasonable argument in support of Deanna's case, she requested that
co-counsel be allowed to assist Gentry with her case. Gentry then withdrew.
Upon Gentry's withdrawal, it became apparent that he was grossly
unprepared for the hearing scheduled in a few days based upon the client file that
was delivered to Deanna's new counsel. In fact, it was discovered, after Gentry's
withdrawal, that the opposing party had filed a Trial Memorandum months before
that Gentry had completely failed to discuss with Deanna so she could be informed
about the opposing party's case. At no time during Gentry's representation did
Gentry inform Deanna about the contents and allegations contained in the opposing
party's Trial Memorandum. (See Record Index p. 424, Defendant's Memorandum
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of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, Ex. A, paragraph 33.)
After Gentry withdrew from her case and Deanna discovered that Gentry
had not prepared her case nor had informed her about critical aspects of her case,
the firm sent her a final bill dated May 7, 2003, that reflected an amount due and
owing that was well beyond the amount of money she believed she had to spend on
the case, based upon her initial conversation with Gentry.
The May 7, 2003 invoice was excessive, calculated a balance due and owing
that was fraudulent and inaccurate, and requested fees for work Gentry performed
on April 11, 2003, even though he had chosen to withdraw as counsel in the early
morning of that day, and also reflected fees for work performed by other members
of the firm days after the firm had withdrawn. In addition, this invoice reflected
additional attorney fees for an attorney whom Deanna had never met to apparently
discuss the firm's former client, Deanna, and her case with the opposing party's
counsel in the exhumation case. {See Addendum at A3, the May 7, 2003 invoice;
see also Record Index p. 424, Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A.)
Due to the firm's unfair, excessive and fraudulent billing as well as the fact
that the firm had withdrawn as counsel in the midst of the case, Deanna did not pay
the May 7, 2003 invoice.
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On June 3, 2003, the firm initiated a lawsuit against Deanna for Breach of
Contract, demanding payment of monies it claimed Deanna owed. Deanna sought
another attorney to no avail, and answered pro se on June 23, 2003 and counterclaimed with breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress causes of action. (See Answer and Counterclaim,
Record Index p. 7.) Litigation ensued between the parties.
On June 23, 2004, the trial court granted summary judgment for the firm and
against Deanna, first finding no genuine issue of material fact, and further noting
that Deanna's opposition was "quibbling over irrelevancies." (See Addendum at
A7.) Second, the court determined that her arguments were based upon, inter alia,
unrealistic expectations, unrealistic view of the attorney/client relationship,
"cynical speculation of acts, motives, and events that did not occur," a lack of an
understanding of the unusual nature of the unique legal matter the firm was
employed to address on Deanna5 s behalf, and a lack of understanding of "legal
services and the ethical obligations of attorneys." (See Addendum at A8.)
Finally, the trial court made much ado about its conclusions that someone
was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law on Deanna's behalf, sternly
closing its ruling with the admonishment that "this Court does not sanction the
unauthorized practice of law or knowingly allow any litigant to profit from the
unauthorized practice of law." (See Addendum at A8.) Based upon these three
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rationale, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the firm, along with the
full amount of unpaid fees for services the firm allegedly rendered, interest on
those unpaid fees, and reasonable attorney's fees and costs for the breach of
contract action. (See Addendum at A8.)
Shortly after the summary judgment, in an attempt to correct the trial court's
conclusion that Deanna, a pro se litigant, or someone on her behalf, was engaging
in the unauthorized practice of law, Deanna set forth the details of her pro se
representation in an affidavit attached to her Rule 52(b) and Rule 59(e) Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment (see Record Index p. 661) and also again addressed
many of the factual issues that she believed were material in this case. This motion
to alter or amend the judgment was denied by the trial court on August 20, 2004.
This Appeal followed. (See Addendum at A13, Record Index p. 875.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court, by granting summary judgment upon all of the
grounds as set forth by the firm, abused its discretion as follows: (1) by its failure
to apply the correct standard of law to the firm's breach of contract claim, (2) by its
failure to rule that Deanna sufficiently pled material misrepresentations to
presently material facts in her cause of action for fraud, (3) by its failure to rule
Deanna sufficiently pled in her Answer and Counterclaim, and throughout the
other documents presented to him, a cause of action for breach of contract, (4) by
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its failure to rule Deanna sufficiently pled damages as a result of the firm's alleged
breach of its fiduciary duties, and (5) by its failure to rule that Deanna sufficiently
pled facts sufficient to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress due to the special nature of the attorney-client relationship.
Further, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the
firm for prosecuting and defending against Deanna's causes of action when the
language in the fee agreement fails to support such award and when the firm's
attorneys failed to comply with Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, even
though Deanna requested such compliance.
ARGUMENT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE FIRM'S BREACH OF CONTRACT
CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND WAS
CLEARLY AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
In its own breach of contract case, the firm identified Utah's three part test
for breach of contract claims, namely that a plaintiff must establish invasion of a
legal right, a causal connection between the legal wrong suffered and damages
claimed, and sufficiently certain damages. See Winsness v. M.J. Conoco
Distributors, Inc., 593 P.2d 1303,1305 (Utah 1979); Gould v. Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 309 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1957); Terry v. Panek, 631
P.2d 896, 897 (Utah 1981); 5A Corbin, Contracts Section 1022 (1964).

13

While the trial court found that the firm suffered a breach of the contract between
itself and Deanna, it chose to ignore the same standard in Deanna's counterclaim
and instead followed the firm's position that Deanna's breach of contract was not
sufficiently pled.
Deanna's argument has always been that the firm breached its contract to
provide her with legal services of a certain standard, namely to provide competent
service, bill reasonably and accurately, and communicate with the client. As the
firm identified to the trial court:
When legal services are involved, c[a]n action for breach of a
promise is governed by rules of contract rather than rules of
legal malpractice.' 1 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith,
Legal Malpractice section 8.5, at 590 (4th ed. 1996). To
properly state a cause of action for breach of contract in the
'context of legal representation and an attorney-client
relationship, a plaintiff [counterclaimant] must plead (1)
[existence of] a valid and enforceable contract; (2)
performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the express promise
by the defendant; and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulting
from the breach.' Bennett v. Jones, 70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003).
While arguing in its summary judgment motion that Deanna failed to plead that she
performed under the contract, the firm itself failed to plead in its own cause of
action that it performed all of its obligations under the contract. (See Plaintiffs
Complaint, Record Index p. 1; see also Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Record Index p. 348.)
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The firm also suggested that Deanna's contention that the agreement
included the expectation to bill fairly and accurately "may apply to a breach of
contract issue, but does not constitute a material misrepresentation as required
under a fraud cause of action. The case law cited by Defendant again applied to
breach of contract action regarding attorney's fees, not a fraud claim." (See
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment, Record Index p. 610). While the firm admitted
that Deanna's breach of contract claim was possible, Deanna's claim was later
dismissed. Even though the firm failed to plead its performance under the
agreement, failed to plead the charges were fair and reasonable, and admitted some
validity to Deanna's breach of contract claim, the trial court ignored the apparent
contradiction when it dismissed Deanna's claim and granted the firm's summary
judgment motion regarding the same cause of action.
The trial court abused its discretion by applying a different standard of law
to the firm versus the standard of law applied to Deanna, and therefore this Court
should vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for trial on its merits. The
trial court was well aware of Deanna's contentions and the legal authority behind
her position. Deanna identified Bennett v. Jones, 70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003), and
always maintained the position that there was no language in the firm's Complaint
establishing that it performed its duties under the contract. (See Defendant's
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment, Record Index p. 424.)
It is ultimately obvious that granting summary judgment where there are
issues of material fact was inappropriate at this juncture. A close examination of
the documents presented to the trial court throughout the litigation establishes
factual disputes regarding the firm's performance under the agreement. For
instance, the fee agreement did not contain the explicit or express language that
Deanna was responsible for a "sample invoice" that the firm attached to a motion
filed with the trial court three months after the firm initiated its breach of contract
claim. Even with the blatant factual issue, the trial court awarded the firm "unpaid
fees" that included fees addressed in the "sample invoice" at an annual interest rate
of 18 percent. The trial court abused his discretion by awarding unbilled fees and
interest upon those unbilled fees. A "sample invoice" and 18 percent interest upon
a "sample invoice" was never within the four corners of the fee agreement. (See
Addendum at A5, July 15, 2003 "sample invoice.") Deanna identified these
discrepancies whenever she could; however the trial court chose to ignore the
factual discrepancies and issue a summary judgment for the firm instead.
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEANNA'S FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE
CLIENT PROPERLY PLED ALL OF THE REQUIRED ELEMENTS
The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed Deanna's fraud
cause of action apparently based upon the following two grounds: (i) Deanna had
not sufficiently pled that the firm made a material representation; and (ii) Deanna
had not sufficiently pled that the firm made a material misrepresentation regarding
a presently material fact. However, Deanna5 s Counterclaim did plead that the firm
made a material representation to Deanna, to which Deanna alleged throughout the
litigation. (See Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition
to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Record Index p. 424;
Defendant/Counterclaimant's Rule 52(b) and Rule 59(e) Motions to Alter or
Amend Judgment, Record Index pp. 661 and 776.)
The firm argued that Deanna failed to sufficiently plead that it had made a
material representation and further asserted the following:
In paragraph 47 of Defendant's Counterclaim, Defendant
asserts that c[u]nder the attorney-client contract, Plaintiff
represented to Defendant/Counterclaimant that Plaintiff would
bill for its time fairly and accurately.' . . . . within the four
corners of the agreement between the parties, Plaintiff did not
represent that 'Plaintiff would bill for its time fairly and
accurately,' nor does Defendant assert the same.
However, as shown by the firm's own restatement of Deanna's counterclaim, it is
very clear that Deanna did assert that the firm did in fact represent to her that it
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would bill for its time fairly and accurately. Deanna, in her opposition to summary
judgment, identified that in paragraphs 46 and 47 of her Counterclaim she pled that
she entered into an agreement for legal services with Eric Gentry thereby
establishing an attorney-client contract; and that under the attorney-client contract
(establishing both the written fee agreement as well as the implied duties that make
up an attorney-client relationship), the firm 'represented' to her, through
Mr. Gentry's statements and through the written fee agreement, that Plaintiff
would bill for its time fairly and accurately as well as 'encourage a process of
communication' to keep her abreast of events and to see that matters progress to
her satisfaction, among others. (See Answer and Counterclaim, Record Index p. 7;
see also Record Index p. 424, Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A,
paragraphs 22-23.)
In order for the fee agreement to be enforceable, the firm must bill fair and
reasonable charges unless otherwise stated in the agreement; otherwise, the terms
and conditions of the contract would be "absurd," therefore invalidating all terms
of the contract. (See In Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 71 P.3d 188 (2003). 'The
parties dispute whether the language of the contract explicitly requires that
recoverable costs and fees be reasonable. However, to interpret the contract so as
to allow unreasonable costs and fees would reduce the costs and fees recovery
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provision "to absurdity."' Id. Thus, we hold that this contract does require
reasonableness." (emphasis added).
The firm's position contradicted Heritage Imports' holding, as it moved in
its summary judgment motion that it did not need explicit language governing
reasonable fees. Its position is further bolstered by the firm's additional arguments
that Deanna failed to assert that the firm made the verbal representation to bill
fairly and accurately at any time during their attorney/client relationship. Besides
the implication of such a position that if there is no language in the four comers of
an agreement or verbal promises made regarding fair and accurate billing that a
law firm should not be held responsible for unfair and inaccurate billing, summary
judgment should have never been granted as whether representations were or were
not made are issues of material fact that must be decided by the trier of fact only.
(See Defendant's Counterclaim, Record Index p. 7; Defendant's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs motion for Summary Judgment,
Record Index p. 424.)
In addition, the firm in its motion for summary judgment, on page 11, made
the following statement: "In the present case, Defendant [sic] concedes that an
attorney client relationship existed and Plaintiff [had] various fiduciary/ethical
duties to Defendant as a result of the attorney-client relationship." Deanna set
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forth the following law in her opposition to motion for summary judgment that
states explicitly what fiduciary duties the firm owed to Deanna:
"'[A]ctions [for breach of fiduciary duty] are grounded
on the fundamental principle that attorneys must be
completely loyal to their clients and must never use
their position of trust to take advantage of client
confidences for themselves or for other parties.'
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283,
1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). cIn all relationships with
clients, attorneys are required to exercise impeccable
honesty, fair dealing, and fidelity.' Id. (emphasis added.)
Indeed, due to their 'professional responsibility and the
confidence and trust' that their clients 'legitimately
repose' in them, attorneys 'must adhere to a high
standard of honesty, integrity [,] and good faith in
dealing with' their clients. Id. (quotations and citations
omitted.) Attorneys are 'not permitted to take
advantage of [their] position or superior knowledge
to impose upon [clients]; nor to conceal facts or law,
nor in any way deceive [clients]; without being
held responsible therefor.' Id. (emphasis added)
(quotations and citation omitted.)' See Walter v.
Stewart, 2003 UT App. 86 (filed March 27, 2003,
CaseNo.20010866-CA)."
(See pp. 26 and 27 of Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Record Index
p. 424.)
If a client cannot rely upon its law firm to bill him or her fairly or accurately
without the explicit language in a fee agreement that states "The firm will bill you
fairly and accurately," then it would behoove any court to require specific language
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to the same to ensure that the firm will be held responsible for billing that is unfair
and inaccurate.
Regarding the firm's assertion that Deanna failed to sufficiently plead a
material misrepresentation regarding a presently material fact, the firm made the
following argument: ". . . Defendant has asserted that fraud occurred because
Plaintiff somehow padded bills, had staff bill for services, sent out a bill on April
17, 2003, which was inaccurate and did not disclose opposing counsel filed a Trial
Memorandum . . .." Apparently the trial court and the firm do not regard the
firm's alleged padding of bills, billing $65.00 for paralegals to perform clerical
tasks, double-billing and the myriad of other disputed facts with regard to this Law
Firm's bill as a presently material fact for a jury to determine. Once again, to
ignore these issues of material fact does not allow for summary judgment.
The firm also has admitted to mailing an inaccurate bill dated May 7,
2003, but the firm only admitted to mailing this inaccurate bill three months
after it initiated its breach of contract cause of action and only after Deanna
attached the fraudulently mailed May 7, 2003 bill as an exhibit to her opposition to
the firm's first motion for summary judgment. (See Defendant/Counterclaimant's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed August 15, 2003, Record Index p. 65.)
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Further, in Deanna's opposition to this motion for summary judgment, she
addressed the following Law Firm's presently material misrepresentations as
follows:
"Defendant, throughout her fraud claim, asserted presently
material facts which have been shown to be false
representations, both from the written fee agreement and
from the implied attorney-client relationship that clearly
existed, such as billing paralegal fees for secretarial
duties consisting of typing and copying, and other
billing procedures that were not provided for under the
Agreement. Plaintiff fraudulently billed outside of
the explicit terms of the Agreement in order to induce
Defendant into paying these fraudulent and excessive
fees. In addition, Plaintiff has now admitted to
falsely billing time associated with the May 7, 2003
invoice. It is now the job of the fact-finder to determine
if Plaintiff 'inadvertenly' mailed this bill or if it was
intentionally and willfully mailed in an attempt to
induce Defendant into paying even more fraudulent
fees than had already been extracted from Defendant.
In addition, based upon new information that Defendant
obtained through research, Mr. Gentry represented to
Defendant at the time of the execution of the Agreement
that he was qualified to handle her case. In fact,
Mr. Gentry had just been admitted to the Bar approximately
two weeks prior to taking on this case. Had Mr. Gentry
informed Defendant that he was just recently admitted
to the Bar, that he would require assistance from other
members of the firm, that he would bill for secretarial
duties, that he would bill for three attorneys in the firm
to discuss the bill, that he would not keep Defendant
informed about important aspects of her case, Defendant
would not have entered into the Agreement with Plaintiff.
Defendant relied on Mr. Gentry to be truthful about these
representations based upon the one basic fact that he is
an attorney-at-law and attorneys are held to a higher
moral standard than most because of the position they
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hold as a fiduciary to their client. Defendant's fraud
claim is well pled and should be placed before a jury."
(See pp. 24 and 25 of Defendant's Memorandum on Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Record Index,
p. 424.)
At issue in this case is not the reasonableness of $125.00 per hour for
Mr. Gentry's time, nor the hourly rate of any employee of the firm, as put forth in
the fee agreement. However, there are unanswered questions of material fact
surrounding the validity of the time billed and the charges stemming from more
than one person performing the same task.
As a matter of law, the trial court erred in granting the firm's summary
judgment on Deanna's fraud cause of action because Deanna did sufficiently plead
her fraud cause of action and did, in fact, plead facts that were disputed by the
firm, and those disputed facts should be placed before a jury.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEANNA'S BREACH OF CONTRACT
CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE
DEANNA PROPERLY PLED ALL OF THE REQUIRED ELEMENTS
The firm argued that Deanna failed to plead that she performed under the
terms of the parties' contract and, therefore, Deanna's breach of contract claim
should be dismissed for failing to assert the required element of "performance"
under a breach of contract claim. This is an inaccurate statement.
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Deanna paid the required $500.00 that the firm (by and through its
employee, Mr. Eric Gentry) estimated the injunction would cost as well as an
additional $4,000 due to the presumption that the firm, by and through Mr. Eric
Gentry, was performing its duties under the contract. However, when Deanna
discovered that the firm was not fulfilling its obligations under the contract,
doubted the firm's performance and questioned the authenticity of the work
claimed to have been performed and billed on the billings statements mailed to
Deanna, the contract between the parties was breached. This breach was further
manifest when Deanna later received a bill for additional monies on a May 7, 2003
invoice the firm later recanted. First the firm expected Deanna to pay the bill, then
later waved off the bill as a mistake. Once again, this matter was material, and
should have been presented to a jury for determination, not the trial court. (See
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Record Index p. 424; Answer and
Counterclaim, Record Index p. 7.)
The firm goes on to argue to the trial court that Deanna failed to assert the
breach of an express promise by Plaintiff. This argument is untrue. The firm
stated the following in its motion for summary judgment:
"In order to assert a breach of contract claim, Defendant
must plead that Plaintiff is in breach of an express promise
made by Plaintiff. The only express promise asserted by
Defendant is not an express promise. Defendant asserts that
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the Agreement states that Plaintiff 'encourages a process
of communication with its clients as legal work proceeds
to insure not only that they are kept abreast of events, but
that matters progress to their satisfaction/ In examining
the above language, Plaintiff does not expressly promise
to communicate with clients or Defendant, Plaintiff
encourages communication. If Plaintiff had stated within
the agreement that Plaintiff shall reasonably communicate
with client or Defendant, an express term would exist, but
in this case, an express promise clearly does not."
The firm is the drafter of the agreement. The firm by this statement is
clearly showing that it has no problem apparently attempting to mislead or induce
its clients into believing, through this language, that the firm will keep its clients
abreast of important aspects about their case and that it will communicate with
them, all the while only viewing this language as "a practice that is encouraged
internally at the firm."
The firm asserted the following argument regarding this contractual
language on page 23 of Plaintiff s Response to Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment:
"Moreover, the only express language cited by Defendant
is Plaintiff 'encourages a process of communication.' As
previously pointed out, this is not an express promise, but
a practice that is encouraged internally at the firm. It
is more of an informational statement. Therefore, the
second required prong of Defendant's cause of action
should also fail."
If the firm believed this language to be merely informational and only a
practice encouraged internally at the firm, it was Mr. Gentry's duty to inform
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Deanna that this language is merely informational only and does not mean that the
firm will actually have to communicate with its Client nor does the firm have to
keep its Client abreast of important aspects about her case, nor is the firm actually
obligated to see that matters progress to Deanna's satisfaction. The firm never
informed its Client that it was not required to do these things.
In the event this Court determines that, at the very least, that language is
ambiguous and not "simply imaginative parsing of contract language to avoid its
clear intent," as the trial court determined in his summary ruling, for this Court's
information, Deanna addressed the law concerning ambiguous language in
contracts on page 30 of her opposition as follows:
"In Jones, Waldo v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996),
the Utah Supreme Court held that:
c
Our own court of appeals in PADD v. Graystone
Pines Homeowners Ass'n, 789 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), construing a written fee agreement between an
attorney and his client, quoted with approval the following
rule enunciated in Hitchcock v. Skelly Oil Co., 201 Kan. 260,
440 P.2d 552, 554 (1968): "It is the general rule that in
construing a contract between attorney and client, doubts
are resolved against the attorney and the construction
adopted which is favorable to the client.55 In McAdam v.
Dynes, 442 N.W.2d 914, 916(N.D. 1989), the court held
that because of the confidential nature of the
attorney-client relationship, "compensation agreements
made during the existence of that relationship are
closely scrutinized and construed most strongly against
the attorney." See 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client section
306 (1980) (stating that foregoing rules are "general
rule55 followed in most cases). The rule is often invoked
in disputes between attorneys and clients arising out of
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ambiguities in a written fee agreement. The rule that
doubts are to be resolved against the attorney comports
with the general rule of contract interpretation that
ambiguous language is to be construed against the
drafter: In choosing among the reasonable meanings
of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that
meaning is generally preferred which operates against
the party who supplies the words or from whom a
writing otherwise proceeds. Restatement (Second)
of Contracts section 206 (1981) see also 3 Arthur L.
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, section 559 (1960) (to
the same effect)."5
The trial court erred in ruling that, (1), Deanna failed to plead that
she performed under the contract and, (2), that she failed to assert a breach of an
express promise by the firm, and, therefore, abused his discretion in granting the
firm's motion for summary judgment dismissing Deanna's breach of contract
cause of action. The trial court has the duty for summary judgment purposes to
view the Answer and Counterclaim and other documents submitted before him in
their entirety to determine whether there are other express promises as well that the
firm allegedly did not perform.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEANNA'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY
DUTY CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED
BECAUSE DEANNA PROPERLY PLED CAUSAL CONNECTION AND
DAMAGES RESULTING THEREFROM
The firm conceded that an attorney-client relationship existed and that the
firm had various fiduciary and ethical duties to Deanna as a result of the attorneyclient relationship. However, the firm disputes that it breached any of its fiduciary
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and ethical duties it owed Deanna and suggests that even if a breach of the
relationship took place, no causal link to damages exists. The firm goes on to
assert that Deanna must demonstrate that she would have prevailed in her case "or
not suffered any damages, but for the actions o f the firm.
The firm listed the following damages that Deanna alleges resulted from its
action: complete forfeiture of attorney fees, compensation in the amount of
$4,500, compensation in the amount of $5,400 for attorney fees paid to new
counsel, damages for emotional distress, compensation for medical expenses,
punitive damages and attorney fees incurred in defending and prosecuting this
action,
Deanna, as shown on p. 27 of her memorandum in opposition to the motion
for summary judgment, argued that the firm breached its duties by failing to
exercise due diligence, adequate communication to apprise her of her case status,
and failing to demonstrate on a basic human level integrity and loyalty to her in
front of the opposing counsel. It is not a surprise that Deanna lost faith in her
counsel and questioned that loyalty. In In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978),
the Supreme Court of Utah determined that an attorney's disloyal conduct to his
client did not measure up to the high standard of fidelity in dealing with clients that
members of the Bar should maintain, and that his disloyal conduct constituted a
breach of his professional duty and of his contract with his client. The court
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further determined that he should not be entitled to the fee paid him for the
promised services. 'Where there has been a deviation from proper professional
standards, there should be some appropriate penalty, not only for the effect upon
the attorney but as a salutary measure for the benefit of the Bar and the public/ See
In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978).
In this case, summary judgment on this issue was inappropriate. Whether
the firm breached its professional duty and contract with Deanna is a question best
left in the hands of a jury. Deanna properly pled the cause of action, thereby
allowing this matter to be heard before a jury of her peers.
The firm, on p. 13 of its memorandum of points and authorities in support of
motion for summary judgment, suggests the possibility of punitive damages, citing
Utah Code Annotated section 78-18-l(l)(a); Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc.
675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983); cited in Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.2d
1064 (Utah 2003).
The firm goes on to characterize Deanna5 s breach of fiduciary duty cause of
action as one alleging the following: "Again, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did
not do proper research, failed to properly communicate, laughed when opposing
counsel made sarcastic statements regarding Defendant, billed too much and
padded bills,. . ." The firm also characterized, on pp. 15 and 16 of its motion for
summary judgment, Deanna's present case as one alleging the following:
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"In the present case, Defendant has asserted that Plaintiff
has engaged in the following conduct: 'intentional
misconduct, disloyalty to its client, breach of confidentiality
in order to harm former client, fraudulent billing, failing
to communicate with its client, and failure to disclose
important facts about the case in order to give its client
the right to make informed decisions about her case,5
did not return phone calls, failed to disclose the
existence of a trial memorandum, were present when
Mr. Hughes stated, 'you got the money, I got the
time, [and] she's got the money, bill her heavy,'
laughed at the comment by Mr. Hughes, making
disturbing derogatory comments about the
Defendant's husband, billing practices were fraudulent
and willful, contacting Mr. Hughes regarding the
case and the breach of Defendant."
The firm, on p. 16, then stated: "The conduct asserted by Defendant is at best
'tortuous, injurious, or malicious," . . . . Again, the firm argued that "punitive
damages will only be awarded in Utah 'upon clear and convincing proof of "willful
and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of others."'
As shown above, Deanna can prove "but for" the actions (that is, the breach
of the firm's fiduciary duties it owed to Deanna) of this Law Firm, Deanna would
not have sustained the damages that directly resulted from the firm's breach.
Therefore, summary judgment should not have been rendered against Deanna on
her breach of fiduciary duty cause of action and the facts surrounding this cause of
action should be placed before a jury.
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEANNA'S INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE DEANNA PROPERLY PLED FACTS THAT
CAN CONSTITUTE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS
The firm in its argument cited Bennett v. Jones. 70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003) in
which cc[t]o be considered outrageous, the conduct must evoke outrage or
revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair. . . Conduct 'is not
necessarily outrageous merely because it is tortuous, injurious, or malicious, or
because it would give rise to punitive damage, or because it is illegal.5 .. . 'The
liability [for intentional infliction of emotional distress] clearly does not extend to
mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other
trivialities.'" (Citations omitted).
To support its motion, the firm noted Deanna's assertions of its conduct,
including:
'intentional misconduct, disloyalty to its client, breach of confidentiality in order to
harm former client, fraudulent billing, failure to communicate with its client, and
failure to disclose important facts about the case in order to give its client the right
to make informed decisions about her case,5 did not return phone calls, failed to
disclose the existence of a trial memorandum, were present when Mr. Hughes
stated, cyou got the money, I got the time, [and] she's got the money, bill her
heavy,5 laughed at the comment by Mr. Hughes, making disturbing derogatory
comments about Defendant's husband, billing practices were fraudulent and
willful, contacting Mr. Hughes regarding the case and the breach of Defendant.
As shown above, the Utah Supreme Court in the Bennett v. Jones case,
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held that "conduct is not necessarily outrageous merely because it is tortuous,
injurious, or malicious, or because it would give rise to punitive damage, or
because it is illegal (emphasis added)." The Utah Supreme Court, by the use of the
language of "not necessarily outrageous . . . , " leaves open the cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress for conduct that is tortuous, injurious, or
malicious and that type of conduct can be considered outrageous, depending upon
whether that conduct evokes outrage and revulsion. The firm then states the
following, on p. 16: "The conduct asserted by Defendant is at best "tortuous,
injurious, or malicious,. . ."
Deanna, in her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, on p. 29,
defended her factual allegations and cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Essentially, the issue as to whether the conduct was outrageous
or not should be left in the hands of a jury, not the trial court in a motion for
summary judgment. Due to the extreme emotional tax placed upon Deanna over
the desecration of her son's grave, any such conduct to which the firm has best
characterized as "tortuous, injurious, or malicious" may indeed be considered
outrageous. Once again, such a question should have been placed in the hands of
Deanna' peers, not the trial court. In addition, Deanna did plead damages as a
result of the firm's outrageous conduct in her Answer and Counterclaim. (See
Record Index p. 7.)
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THE FEE AGREEMENT DOES NOT ALLOW FOR ATTTORNEY'S FEES
IN PROSECUTING ITS BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM NOR DOES IT
ALLOW FOR RECOVERY OF FEES ACCRUED IN DEFENSE OF
DEANNA'S CAUSES OF ACTION,
The trial court awarded the firm $14,204.00 of attorney fees to handle
this "simple debt collection case," as defined by the firm in its documents
presented to the trial court, without ever requiring the firm to comply with
Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in his judgment dated July 12, 2004.
(See Addendum at Al 1, Record Index p. 740.)
The firm argued that it is entitled to attorney fees in this case to prosecute its
breach of contract cause of action and also to defend Deanna's breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims. The firm, on p. 17 of its memorandum of points and authorities in support
of its motion for summary judgment, quoted the contractual attorney fee provision
as follows: "in the event collection procedures become necessary with respect to a
delinquent account where the account is assigned to an outside attorney firm, all
the costs and expenses including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney's fees
incurred in collecting such delinquent account shall be added to [the] . . . bill."
The facts of the case fail to substantiate the firm's position, and highlights
once again that there are issues of material fact yet to be decided. The firm
admitted that the last bill sent to Deanna regarding the May 7, 2003 invoice was
inaccurate and that Deanna was not obliged to pay it. This admission by the firm
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was made only after the following occurred: (1) the firm filed a Complaint for fees;
(2) the firm filed a Motion for Summary Judgment Motion and Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of that Motion for Summary Judgment, with
Affidavits of Shawn T. Farris and Eric R. Gentry supporting the motion and
affirming that the fees billed were fair and reasonable (see Record Index, p. 56);
(3) Deanna filed her memorandum in opposition to motion for summary judgment,
with her affidavit affirming that the fees were not fair and reasonable and by
attaching a copy of the May 7, 2003 invoice to show the trial court the
unreasonableness and unfairness of fees billed; and (4) the firm filed its Reply to
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment on September 4, 2003, see Record Index p. 98, wherein the firm states
that bill was inaccurate and attaches its billing ledger showing the amount
$7,025.00 as due and owing and a "Sample Invoice" for charges the firm never
billed. Deanna reasonably refused to pay for such a bill, and this led to additional
questions as to the firm's billing practices. As such, there are material facts
regarding the firm's billing practice that must be decided at trial, and not
summarily resolved through this motion for summary judgment.
The trial court erred in his determination that there are no material facts in
this case. If the trial court and this Court just viewed the above facts in a light
most favorable to Deanna, this Court should determine that it is possible that the
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firm fully intended to make its client pay the fraudulent bill, either by receiving
payment from Deanna from the mailed invoice or by having the trial court grant
summary judgment and obtaining the fraudulent fees that way. The above facts, if
taken in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, show that the firm
created a "Sample Invoice" and a "Billing Ledger" in order to commit fraud upon
its client and in an attempt to allow the Court to award fraudulent fees under a
motion for summary judgment.
In addition, the fact that the firm would mail the May 7, 2003 invoice
to Deanna and expect her to pay it would lead any reasonable person to question
the validity, honesty and accuracy of each and every bill submitted previously.
The firm would not have sued its client if Deanna paid the inaccurate bill. (See
Addendum at A3, May 7, 2003 invoice.) Further, the contractual language the firm
uses to support its award of attorney's fees in this case does not anticipate mailing
"fraudulent" or "inaccurate" billing statements to its client and then suing its
client over "fraudulent," "inaccurate" or "unbilled" fees.
In addition, on pp. 4 and 5 of Record Index p. 718, under the heading
"Objection to Plaintiffs Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs," Deanna objected to
the affidavit of the firm's counsel supporting its award of attorney fees as follows:
"Plaintiffs counsel's affidavit does not establish the
reasonableness of the attorney and non-lawyer fees
requested because of his failure to provide for each
item of work the names of the attorneys and
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non-lawyers and the hourly rate for each person who
performed the work. Rule 73(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure states the following:
c
(b) An affidavit supporting a request for
or augmentation of attorney fees shall forth:
(b)(1) the basis for the award; (b)(2) a reasonably
detailed description of the time spent and work
performed, including for each item of work the
name, position (such as attorney, paralegal,
administrative assistant, etc.) and hourly rate
of the persons who performed the work; (b)(3)
factors showing the reasonableness of the
fees. . . .' (emphasis added)"

The trial court failed to require the firm's counsel to comply with Rule 73(b)
and abused his discretion by awarding the attorney fees requested without
compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, if this Court deems
the contractual language to provide an award of attorney fees to the firm's counsel
and if this Court affirms the summary ruling and judgment, then this Court must at
least remand the issue of the reasonableness of the firm's counsel's fee in order to
make its counsel comply with Rule 73(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial court made the following statement in its summary ruling:
"There may be issues as to many immaterial facts, but much of Defendant's
argument is simply imaginative parsing of contract language to avoid its clear
intent. Summary judgment may not be avoided by resorting to quibbling over
irrelevancies." The trial court clearly erred in his ruling and abused his discretion
by awarding attorney fees to the firm based upon the contractual language, by not
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reviewing the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party, and by not requiring the firm to comply with Rule 73 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, this Court should vacate the award
of attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
The trial court clearly erred and abused his discretion when he failed to
apply the same standard of law to the breach of contract causes of action for both
parties. The trial court clearly erred by his failure to view the facts and inferences
therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and look at those facts
and inferences as a whole to determine if a cause of action exists for Deanna. The
trial court clearly erred by his failure to review the Answer and Counterclaim and
all the documents presented before him by Deanna to determine that Deanna did
plead appropriately all her causes of action. Therefore, this Court should vacate
the summary ruling, vacate the judgment, vacate the award of attorney fees, and
remand the case back for jury trial.
Deanna also asks this Court to award her attorney fees and costs on appeal,
depending upon its view of the contractual language, based upon the Utah Code
Ann. Section 78-27-56.5 (1996) that provides as follows: "A court may award
costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any
promissory notes, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986,
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when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow
at least one party to recover attorney's fees.'"
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a M. KenrQiristopherson
a W e s t o n J . White
a C h a d J . Utiey
a Cheryl T . H u n t
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xsent tone the fees charged by this firm are for work o n an hourly basis for legal w o r k performed. T h e standard hourly races for the assigned attorney axe as follows:
M. K e n t Chnstonhcrson
Shawn 1*. Farris
Weston J . White
Chad J. Utiey
ChetyiT.Huat
KxtcR. Gentry

$180,00 p e r hour
$140100 p e r hour
$140.00 p e r hour
$140.00 pec hour
$im00rjerhour_
$125.00 p e r h r g g ^ >

Law Clerks

I7S00 per
$65.00 per
$60.00 p e r
$60:00 per

Legal Assistant
Research Clerk

hour
hour
hour
hour

wmg are t h e costs, if any are incurred, which will be billed to your matter file.

opies
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flJO&perpage

Postage and Long Distance Calls
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in this letter, please feel free to contact us at

wiljb al of its clients. Jfjaa hare any questions about any of the above, or ifyou wish to disoiss any matter not cxrverai
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FORpYWASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRISTOPHERSON, FARRIS, WHITE &
UTLEY, PC, a Utah professional corporation,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 030501122
Judge G. Rand Beacham

vs.
DEANNA PUGH,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,
which was filed with a supporting memorandum and other materials on May 11, 2004.
Defendant filed her opposing memorandum and materials on May 24, 2004. Plaintiff filed
a reply memorandum on June 1,2004 and a request to submit for decision on June 4, 2004.
Neither party requested a hearing.
Having reviewed the lengthy memoranda and numerous other materials filed by the
parties, the Court grants Plaintiffs motion for the following reasons:
1.

Despite the length of the memoranda, the Court finds no genuine issue of

material fact. There may be issues as to many immaterial facts, but much of Defendant5 s
argument is simply imaginative parsing of contract language to avoixHts ~clear~intent.
Summary judgment may not be avoided by resorting to quibbling over irrelevancies.
2.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as requested in its motion.

Defendant's arguments fail because they are, variously, (a) based on unrealistic expecta tions,

such as Plaintiffs failure to answer questions that Defendant never asked, (b) based on an
unrealistic view of the attorney/client relationship, both generally and as pertaining to the
facts of this case, (c) based on cynical speculation about acts, motives, and events which did
not occur, (d) based on a lack of understanding of the unusual nature of the legal matter for
which Defendant originally employed Plaintiff, and (e) based on a lack of understanding of,
or a refusal to understand, the nature of legal services and the ethical obligations of attorneys.
3.

Defendant's memorandum appears to be the product of the unauthorized

practice of law. Defendant has repeatedly argued to this Court that she lacks the training and
ability to represent herself, and the Court agrees with Defendant on this point and has advised
her to get an attorney. At least twice, Defendant has attempted to be represented by a person
not licensed to practice law, and the Court has entered at least two orders denying
Defendant's attempts. In light of these facts, Defendant's 31-page memorandum, with 19
attachments and many citations to legal authorities, clearly appears to be the product of the
unauthorized practice of law by some unidentified person who is hoping to "assist"
Defendant. This Court does not sanction the unauthorized practice of law or knowingly
allow any litigant to profit from the unauthorized practice of law.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion is granted and judgment shall be entered for (1) the
full amount of unpaid fees for Plaintiffs services rendered, (2) interest at the contract rate
on all unpaid fees, and (3) reasonable attorney's fees and costs for this action; Plaintiffs

2

counsel should submit an appropriate judgment pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Dated this ^ \

day of June, 2004.

G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE

3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this <Q3 day ofU^UNg. , 2004,1 provided true and correct
copies of the foregoing SUMMARY RULING to each of the attorneys/parties named below
by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at the Fifth District Courthouse
in St. George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the United States Mail, first-class postage
prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Heath Snow
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 2710
St. George, Utah 84771
Deanna Pugh
Defendant
448 East Telegraph, No. 78
Washington, Utah 84780

a{ nU(^dDEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
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ORIGINAL

^i^s^^

^tfs,<*.

BARNEY & McKENNA, P.C.
HEATH H. SNOW - 8563
Attorney for Plaintiff
63 South 300 East, Suite 202
St. George, Utah 84770-2948
(435)628-1711
(435) 628-3318 fax
www .barn ey- mckcn na. co m
WI92 168 1 11 Uoffice files\HS\OCFWU 0595 02\Pleadinss\Judgmem 062504 hhs doc

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRISTOPHERSON, FARRIS, WHITE &
UTLEY, PC,
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v

Civil No. 030501122
Judge G. Rand Beacham

DEANNA PUGH,
Defendant.

The above-entitled Court, having issued its Summary Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment on June 23, 2004 and having reviewed Plaintiffs 2nd Affidavit of Attorney
Fees and Costs, and for good cause showing:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff shall have
Judgment against Defendant, Deanna Pugh, as follows:
$ 9,806.89
Principal as of April 17, 2003
$ 2,100.56
Pre-Judgment Interest @ 18% (434 days x $4 84 per diem)
$ 388.71
Costs
,
>.
£P^re=3ft333a I H ^ O ^ Attorneys Fees per Affidavit1 /wa»v-W^a<--fe« AsA-*cW —<&>)
TOTAL JUDGMENT

1

Said Attorneys Fees includes the $2,082 25 requested in its Proposed (unsigned) Judgment stemming from the
Courts award of attorneys in connection with Plaintiffs successful prosecution of its Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions

1

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said
Judgment shall accrue interest at the post judgment contract rate of 18% per annum from the date
of entry of this Judgment until paid in full.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that in the event it
becomes necessary for Plaintiff to execute upon this Judgment, Defendant shall pay alfeadditional
attorney's fees and costs incurred in the execution of the Judgment, in addition to the costs and
attorney's fees outlined herein above.
TT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said
judgment shall be certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
SO ORDERED this

1^

day of

^N^VA

, 2004.

BY THE COURT:

G. RAND BEACHAM
5th District Court Judge
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